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Abstract 
Why does climate change continue to be a forceful idea which divides people?  What does 
this tell us about science, about culture and about the future?  Despite disagreement, how 
might the idea of climate change nevertheless be used creatively?  In this essay I develop my 
investigation of these questions using four lines of argument.  First, the future risks 
associated with human-caused climate change are severely underdetermined by science.  
Scientific predictions of future climates are poorly constrained; even more so the 
consequences of such climates for evolving human socio-technological and natural 
ecosystems.  Second, I argue that to act politically in the world people have to pass 
judgements on the facts of science; facts do not speak for themselves.  Third, because these 
judgements are different, the strategic goals of policy interventions developed in response 
to risks associated with future climate change are inevitably multiple and conflicting.  Finally, 
reconciling and achieving diverse goals requires political contestation. ‘Moving forward’ on 
climate change then becomes a task of investing in the discursive and procedural pre-
conditions for an agonistic politics to work constructively, to enable ways of implementing 
policies when people disagree.    
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Introduction  
Climate change is an environmental, cultural and political phenomenon which is reshaping 
the way people think about themselves, their societies and their Earthly futures.  It is 
therefore an exemplar case of scientific knowledge, personal experience and the human 
imagination interacting in multiple, complex and changing social contexts.  As Lucien Boia 
observes in his book Weather in the Imagination, “Global warming and global cooling are 
physical phenomenon.  But the battle over these real or presumed developments is a 
cultural and social phenomenon.  In this sense at least, history and meteorology go hand-in-
hand” (Boia 2005, 181).  For example, the idea of climate change has provoked the emerging 
narrative of the Anthropocene – which posits a new geological era in which human actions 
have become dominant in planetary functioning.  In this narrative, the long-standing 
separation in western thought of nature from culture is no longer tenable.  
In Why We Disagree about Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction and 
Opportunity (Hulme 2009), I considered the different ways people think about, and act in 
response to, climate change in the context of science, economics, religion, fear, risk, 
development and politics.  I argued that the idea of climate change mobilises very different 
meanings, ideologies, values and goals ... “it means different things to different people in 
different contexts, places and networks” (p.325).  That book was written during the winter of 
2007/8 and in the eight years since then many things have changed in the cultural politics of 
climate change.  But my key argument remains valid: it is necessary to reveal the underlying 
reasons for disagreement about how to act in response to climate change before it is 
possible to find constructive ways of acting politically in the world.  In this essay I want to 
pursue this investigation further by asking, and seeking to answer, these questions: Why 
does climate change continue to be a forceful idea which divides people and what does this 
tell us about science, about culture and about the future?  What does climate change mean 
to different people?  Despite disagreement, how might the idea of climate change 
nevertheless be used creatively to enact change?   
The anthropologist Michael Dove has argued that climatic and human agency have 
historically been understood not as two separate domains with one causing or shaping the 
other (Dove 2015).  Rather, for much of cultural history and in most places climate and 
human agency have been understood to be co-dependent.  Agency to shape the future is 
distributed between climate and humans; neither climate nor humans are in charge.  The 
idea of human-caused climate change – and its progeny, the idea of the Anthropocene -- has 
(in the enlightened west) reacquainted citizens with the unavoidable intimacy they have 
with the weather.  If true, it means that any account of future climate given by merely 
scientific inquiry can never be complete since human actions are always imaginatively and 
morally reflexive.  Merely constructing scientific truth or establishing expert consensus 
about the biogeophysics of the climate system is too limited a basis for acting in the world 
(Rescher 1993). 
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I develop my investigation along four lines.  First, the future risks associated with human-
caused climate change are severely underdetermined by science.  Although scientific inquiry 
has revealed humans as now powerful actors in influencing the climate system, scientific 
predictions of future climates are poorly constrained.  Even less constrained are the 
consequences of these climates for evolving human socio-technological and natural 
ecosystems.  Second, following Hannah Arendt (1958), I argue that people have to pass 
judgements on facts before they can act politically in the world.  Facts do not speak for 
themselves, least of all the underdetermined facts of the climatic and human future.  Third, 
because people judge the facts of climate change in different ways, the strategic goals of 
policy interventions developed in response to the putative risks associated with future 
climate change are inevitably multiple and conflicting.  They are shaped by different 
worldviews, different ethical systems and different accounts of good human living.  And 
then, finally, how these diverse goals are achieved – the specific policies and human actions 
that materialise in specific societies – remain politically contested.  These policies and 
actions reflect diverse values about what is at stake and different preferences for who is 
licenced to act.  ‘Moving forward’ on climate change then becomes a task of investing in 
discursive and procedural pre-conditions for an agonistic politics to work constructively, to 
enable ways of implementing policies when people disagree.     
 
The Risks of Climate Change are Underdetermined 
Scientific inquiry never yields the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.  Least of 
all can it do so with respect to the future.  The future, singular, is inaccesible to human 
minds because our knowledge of the outcome of interacting physical processes is deficient.  
But it is also underdetermined because of human agency: the mere act of imagining a 
possible future changes the likelihood and character of the future thus imagined.  Despite 
the heroic efforts of many climate change researchers and international knowledge 
assessments such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), this remains 
inescapably the case with regard to the climatic future.  The scientific consensus on climate 
change thus becomes unhelpfully limiting.  The “97.1% consensus” that has been widely 
circulated (e.g. Cook et al. 2013), is a consensus regarding only the extent of the belief 
among relevant experts that humans are exerting a significant influence on the climate 
system.  The future risks for society and ecology resulting from this influence are known by 
experts and analysts much more diffusely.  I have written elsewhere about the dangers of 
climate reductionism (Hulme 2011), about the dangers of elevating climate as a predictor of 
future social and ecological change without appreciating the deep contingency of these 
changes.  The most that can safely be stated is that human actions on the atmosphere are 
changing existing environmental and social risks and introducing new ones.   
The language of risk is one that the IPCC adopted more explicitly in its 5th Assessment 
Report, especially in its Working Group 2 volume on impacts and adaptation options (IPCC 
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2015a,b).  Chris Field, the co-Chair of this Working Group, explained one of the 
consequences of this linguistic move: “Characterising climate change as a challenge in 
managing risks opens doors to a wide range of options for solutions” (Field, quoted in 
Painter 2015, 286).  This is because the idea of ‘risk’  -- with its attendant uncertainties and 
subjectivities -- opens the space for different ethical, political and economic judgements to 
be made about different courses of action to ameliorate or tolerate these risks.  The 
language of risk also challenges the univocal narrative of climate change (‘the plan’ as 
articulated by Sarewitz, 2011) as being partial at best, unhelpful at worst.  Since the risks of 
future climate change are underdetermined, and how those risks are interpreted and acted 
upon is plural, we begin to see why climate change means different things for different 
people in different places, indeed why it must do so.  Masking such differences by 
repeatedly emphasising the limited – limited in epistemic extent rather than depth – 
scientific consensus is unhelpful (Hulme 2015a). 
 
Passing Judgement on the Facts 
‘Nature’ should never be our moral or political guide, as is clear for example in relation to 
sexual or development ethics.  Quite apart from philosophical objections to such a position1, 
since human actions are increasingly re-shaping bodily and planetary natures, there is no 
‘nature’ which is itself free from human agency (Albertson & King 2010).  Yet even if there 
were, simply knowing ‘the facts’ of climate change would be insufficient to inspire or 
determine political action in the world.  The former Chairman of the IPCC, R K Pachauri, was 
profoundly wrong when he claimed in November 2014 at the launch of the Synthesis Report 
of the IPCC’s 5th Assessment that, “All we need is the will to change, which we trust will be 
motivated by … an understanding of the science of climate change” (IPCC 2014).  Simply 
understanding climate science is not all that is needed to act.  Similarly, when the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science called for ‘decisive political action’ on climate 
change on the basis of ‘what we know’ (Pinholster 2014), they begged the question about 
how diverse and competing human political and ethical values are to be reconciled for 
determining what that ‘decisive action’ should consist of. 
What climate change requires of us cannot be read from the pages of the IPCC’s Fifth 
Assessment Report.  There is no one story to tell about climate change; there is no single 
imperative to act.  Hannah Arendt explained this position half a century ago in ‘The Human 
Condition’ (Arendt 1958).  For Arendt, each individual has to pass judgement on the facts 
before they can act politically in the world,  
                                                          
1  See Kwame Appiah’s review (Appiah 2010) of Sam Harris’s 2010 book ‘The Moral Landscape: How Science 
Determines Human Values’. 
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“The question is only whether we wish to use our new scientific and technical 
knowledge in this [or that] direction and this question cannot be determined by 
scientific means; it is a political question of the first order and therefore can 
hardly be left to the decision of professional scientists or professional politicians” 
[p.3]. 
Integral to such judgement is the establishment of meaning.  ‘What do the facts mean?’  
Since climate change prompts us to think about the future, and about human responsibility 
for that future, cosmologies, ideologies, beliefs and cultural practices become relevant and 
motivating.  These rich and historically mediated human attributes help us to pass 
judgement on the facts.  Merely ‘understanding the science of climate change’ can never be 
enough.  The meaning of climate change, and the moral and ethical demands it places upon 
humans, will therefore inevitably be understood differently within and across diverse human 
cultures.  Meaning-making precedes action.  To quote Arendt again: “Men [sic] in the plural, 
that is, men in so far as they live and move and act in this world can experience 
meaningfulness only because they can talk with and make sense to each other and to 
themselves” [p.4].  The diversity of meanings which emerges from the idea of climate 
change, and what animates such meanings, is well explored in two recent books: Candis 
Callison’s ‘How Climate Change Comes to Matter: the Communal Life of Facts’ (2014) and 
Philip Smith and Nicholas Howe’s ‘Climate Change as Social Drama’ (2015).  
Given that climate change induces multiple meanings it is perhaps fruitful to think of the 
phrase ‘climate change’ as a synedoche; i.e., as replacive speech in which a part stands for a 
whole (as in ‘fifty sail’ for ‘fifty ships’) or vice versa (as in ‘society’ for ‘high society’).  So what 
things, what ideas, might climate change ‘stand for’?  Out of a much large array of 
possibilites let me suggest here just four. 
 
Climate change stands for ‘risk society’ 
Taking inspiration from the work of Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, this modernist reading 
of climate change places it as a future risk which disciplines the present.  Both authors 
approach climate change firmly from the perspective of modernity and the idea that today’s 
societies, unlike preceding ones, live in the future rather than in the past.  For Giddens, a risk 
society is one which becomes preoccupied with future risk and concerned with how such 
speculative risks can be tamed and safely navigated in the present.  Ulrich Beck explains, 
“Risk society means that the past is losing its power of determination of the 
present.  It is being replaced by the future, that is to say, something non-existent, 
fictitious and constructed, as the basis for present-day action …  Expected risks 
are the whip to keep the present in line.  The more threatening the shadows that 
fall on the present because a terrible future is impending, the more believed are 
the headlines provoked by the dramatisation of risk today” (Beck 1997, 20). 
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Climate change with its future drama and ‘threatening shadows’ works precisely to exert 
such a hold on the present.  Climate risks become mediatised (Weingart et al. 2000); climate 
change becomes an imagined spectacle which appears to ‘demand’ new techno-economic 
instruments of risk management.  
 
Climate change stands for ‘capitalism’ 
A different reading of climate change is to understand it as a decisive weapon to use in an 
ideological struggle.  Climate change thus becomes a synedoche for the evils of global 
capitalism.  Naomi Klein’s book ‘This Changes Everything: Climate versus Capitalism’ (Klein 
2014) is a good illustration of this position.  Klein makes explicit this instrumental role that 
climate change plays for her: “… I realized the science of global warming … could be a 
catalyst for forms of social and economic justice in which I already believed” [p.59].  Climate 
change works in this way too for those seeing the world through an explicitly socialist 
ideology, here Suzanna Jeffrey writing in International Socialism (Jeffrey 2011), 
“Those of us fighting for change should ensure that we mount a political battle 
against the climate sceptics, not simply a scientific one ... the real enemy is the 
capitalist system, which puts profit before the lives of billions of humans and the 
planet ... the real allies in this fight [are] the millions of working people around 
the world who have no vested interest in a system that prioritises profit over the 
world’s climate.” 
 
Climate change stands for ‘lost nature’ 
A third meaning of climate change is that is stands for a lost nature.  Bill McKibbin’s best-
selling book ‘The End of Nature’ (McKibbin 1989) was an early and prominent articulation of 
this narrative with respect to climate change, but it is a narrative which has deep resonance 
across many cultures (Rudiak-Gould 2012; Haluza-Delay 2014).  The Edenic myth is a lament 
for a lost order and stability to a natural (and maybe God-given) world.  Climate change eats 
away at the material foundations of a utopian future, a sentiment captured by Boia, “The 
history of humanity is characterised by an endemic anxiety … it is as if something or 
someone is remorselessly trying to sabotage the world’s driving force – and particularly its 
climate” (Boia 2005, 149).  It is the same anxiety as echoed in this lament from the UK’s 
Camp for Climate Action (2008), 
“Not long ago we knew the best time for planting seeds … when the leaves 
would turn deep orange, when to look forward to building snowmen.  Things like 
the cuckoo’s dependable call would be a sign that spring had come.  There was a 
kind of certainty to our lives ... But the cuckoo’s are disappearing and it seems all 
the patterns of the world are being scrambled ... For the first time in human 
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history the ability of our planet’s ecosystems to sustain future generations can 
no longer be taken for granted.” 
Climate change therefore unsettles what had been presumed to be settled, whether that be 
a particular set of climatic conditions (Hulme 2015b) or an assumed purity or separateness 
of the natural world beyond the reach of humans.  This way of making sense of climate 
change, of giving it meaning, resonates with the idea of ‘things falling apart’ which Nigerian 
novelist Chinua Achebe explored – in a different context - in his eponymous best-selling 
post-colonial novel set in West Africa (Achebe 1965).  And it is reflected too in The Dark 
Mountin Project, a UK-based cultural movement triggered by the negotiating failures of 
COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009.  In the words of joint founder Paul Kingsnorth (undated),  
“Dark Mountain became a wider cultural movement of people who had stopped 
believing in the conventional narratives about the future, and who wanted to 
start unweaving some of the myths of human centrality; of our separation from 
something called ‘Nature’; of endless progress; of our ability to control the 
Earth.” 
 
Climate change stands for ‘the Anthropocene’ 
A fourth synedoche for climate change is to see it standing in for the larger (and more 
ambiguous) idea of the Anthropocene.  This proposed new epoch is one in which the 
collective force of human activities remakes the physical world and leaves ineradicable 
traces in geological strata; in the words of one recent review, “Human actvity is now global 
and is the dominant cause of most contempoerary environmental change” (Lewis & Maslin 
2015, 171).  With climate change as a synedoche for the Anthropocene it becomes an idea 
which reveals the changed relationship between humans and nature, an idea which “invites 
techno-managerial planning and expert administration at the expense of democratric debate 
and contestation” (Lövbrand et al. 2015, 217).  Yet there are many different Anthropocenes 
to be imagined.  For some, climate change offers the hope of a ‘brave new world’ and the 
prospects of a ‘Great Anthropocene’ (EcoModernist Manifesto 2015) and for others the 
possibilities of a ‘Charming Anthropocene’ (Buck 2015).  For others still, climate change 
signals the first moves into dangerous ‘operating space’ for humanity (Rockström et al. 
2009).   
 
Multiple and Conflicting Goals 
With the facts of climate change judged in these and other ways, it becomes clearer to see 
the range of preferred courses of action to be pursued. Out of these different meanings, 
these different narratives of what climate change stands for, emerge multiple and often 
conflicting goals.  The goals of ‘action’ on climate change might therefore be, inter alia, to 
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limit global warming to two degrees, to deliver creation care, to design a planetary 
thermostat, to transform civilisation or to safeguard economic growth -- or indeed to secure 
fair growth, zero growth or de-growth.  All of these goals have prima facie credibility since 
they emerge from different readings of what climate change is about, inspired by different 
cosmologies and ethical or political values.  They emerge from different judgements being 
passed on the facts.  Far from their being the possibility of a singular ‘decisive political 
action’ on climate change, the strategic goals of policy interventions are inevitably 
multivariate because they are shaped by different worldviews and different narratives of 
good human living.   
It is for this reason that Luers and Sklar (2014, 114) declare that “.. the focus on a single 
target [two degrees of warming] has become an obstacle [to effective policy-making] 
because it ... frames climate change as a distant abstract threat and fails to recognise the 
diversity of values and risk perceptions of people around the world.”  This, too, is the 
position taken by Victor and Kennel (2014) in their argument for moving away from a 
singular climate policy target in favour of a basket of goals, a strategy of multiple goal-
seeking.  Climate risks have to be contextualised alongside other risk and welfare issues, for 
example as articulated in the multiple objectives of the newly negotiated Sustainable 
Development Goals.  This move away from climate exceptionalism was evident in the 
framing of some of the chapters in the IPCC’s 5th Assessment Working Group 2 Report (IPCC 
2015a,b).   
 
Using Politics to Move Forward 
So, in the light of such diversity and plurality what way forward?  One way is the programme 
of global environmental visioning – under the rubric ‘the future we want’ – that has been 
developed for the United Nations.  This initiative, emerging from the Rio+20 Summit in 2012, 
aims to gather “... priorities of people from every corner of the world, [to] ... build a 
collective vision that will be used directly by the UN and World Leaders to plan a new 
development agenda launching in 2015, one that is based on the aspirations of all citizens!” 
(Beyond2015 2014).  But can a ‘collective vision’ based on the ‘aspirations of all citizens’ 
really be constructed?  In their analysis of a similar global visioning process conducted by the 
Danish Government in 2009 in the run-up to COP15 in Copenhagen, Blue and Medlock 
(2014) identify the dangers of such ambition.  Their careful analysis of the framings and 
citizen engagements used in this process concluded that it is essential to maintain diversity 
of meanings and plurality of visions in such dialogues: “... the more universal and 
standardized scientific discourse becomes for global policy purposes, the more responsive 
formal participatory initiatives should be to diverse public meanings” (p.576).  A singular 
‘future’ imagined by a collective ‘we’ is an unachievable goal.   
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Neither, I suggest, is the way forward simply an endorsement of the types of elitist 
proclamation about ‘what must be done’, such as the one released by the Earth League on 
Earth Day in April 2015 (Earth League 2015).  This self-selecting group of 18 leading 
academics and environmental scientists offered the world’s governments, meeting in Paris 
at COP21 later in 2015, ‘eight essential elements of climate action’.  They were clear in the 
definitive necessity of what had to be done, using phrases such as ‘The carbon budget must 
...’, ‘We need to …’, ‘Every country must ...’, ‘We must unleash …’, ‘We must safeguard sinks 
…’, ‘We must realise …’  It may be the case that these particular 18 scientists “speak with one 
voice” (quoted in Rockstrom et al. 2015, 607, another article taking inspiration from the 
Earth League), but as I have shown above the world does not.  
Both of these examples of ‘ways forward’ end up suppressing the sheer diversity and 
proliforation of meanings and goals that gain inspiration from the idea of climate change.  
They end up short-circuiting political processes of opening-up, contest and negotiation in the 
name of (scientific) necessity.  Instead, I suggest a different way forward: to invest 
intellectual, political and social capital in establishing the following four pre-conditions for 
recognising and handling such plurality in relation to climate change.  This manifesto is, of 
course, as with the Earth League, an expression of my own normative position.  It does not 
emerge from ‘an understanding of the science of climate change’ nor from some bottom-up 
process of collective global visioning.  And it doesn’t jump into declaring what the world’s 
governments ‘must’ do.  Instead, it draws attention to the importance of appropriate modes 
of proceedure. 
First, science needs to be put in its place.  As I have argued, scientific knowledge about 
climate change will never be decisive in providing the will to change nor in adjudicating what 
should be done in response to the risks: “Science must be part of the democratic process 
and not a substitute for it” (Krauss 2014, 74).  For climate change this implies a shift in 
perspective.  Scientific knowledge, least of all consual knowledge, is not in the foreground.  
Pope Francis’ recent Encyclical, ‘On Care for our Common Home’, is a good example of being 
respectful to science, but not being obedient to it. 
Second, the proliforation of diverse and inspiring narratives and meanings surrounding the 
idea of climate change needs encouragement.  Such narratives gain inspiration and give 
expression to more deeply held human beliefs and values which offer the promise of the 
“full moral voice” the lack of which was lamented by Naomi Klein (Klein 2014).  This would 
include re-animating religious myths and stories which can expand cultural repertoires – 
finding new stories through which to ‘pass judgement’ on the facts of climate change.  As 
Clingerman (2015) argues, given the salience of religion and religious institutions across the 
world, religious voices need to be heard in this public conversation (cf. Mendieta & 
Vanantwerpen 2011).  Again, the 2015 Papal Encyclical is a good example (Pope Francis 
2015). 
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Third, investment should be made in strengthening forms of political representation which 
are able to function under conditions of deep conflict – both at state level, but also above 
and below the state.  Living with climate change is nothing less than living in an agonistic 
democracy, in which those whose preferred policy options are rejected by political power 
nevertheless acquiesce in decisions because their voice has been heard (Rescher 1993).  It is 
crucial to cultivate adequate spaces of public encounter and listening beyond the echo-
chambers and information cocoons of the internet and digital social media (Sunstein 2009).   
The conditions that make political judgement possible -- trust in institutions, accountable 
power, respect for contrary opinions, legitimate forms of representation – cultivate an 
agonisitic politics and an acquiescent polity (Mouffe 2005).   
Fourth, I suggest that investment is needed in the cultivation of virtuous citizens, citizens 
who act resolutely in the world from a sense of appropriate purpose.  This is an argument I 
have made esewhere with respect to climate change (Hulme 2014) and one that is echoed in 
other recent work.  Di Paola (2015), for example, draws attention to the virtues of 
mindfulness and cheerfulness in the Anthropocene, for him given expresson through the 
cultivation of ‘urban gardens’, while Stirling (2015) calls for mutual relations of ‘care’ over 
the domineering rhetoric of ‘control’. 
The goals of climate policy interventions matter, yes.  And these need clear articulation, 
drawing upon the range of cultural beliefs and political values that are held between and 
within our societies.  In a healthy democracy it is necessary to expose this diversity of goals; 
and reconciling conflicting goals is what politics is for.  But the most precious investment is 
to lay down the right conditions for how people wish to live and decide together, 
agonistically, in democratic societies.  This is to establish a secure and rightful basis for how 
politics is to work, for how the powerful are to be held accountable and the powerless to be 
heard.  Ends matter, but so too do means.  We can neither predict nor control what the 
outcome of these political conditions and human virtues will be.  But then neither can global 
climate be controlled nor climate change solved.  It is not that sort of phenomnon. 
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